Policy and t he New View of International
"new view" of international capital movements makes the fraction of total assets held abroad a function of the level of interest rates and estimates of risk both at home and abroad.7 For certain kinds of assets, such as shortterm claims on foreigners, other variables, such as exports, are added to the list of explanatory variables.
In this view, the stock of assets held abroad depends on the level of interest rates, the stock of total assets, and the levels of other variables, such as exports. An increase in U.S. interest rates will then cause a shift in the stock of assets toward the United States-the "stock-shift effect"-and, assuming a continuing growth in total assets, a reallocation of marginal additions to total assets towards the United States-the "continuing flow effect." There is a presumption, discussed below, that the flow effect is small relative to the stock effect.
With stock-shift effects large compared with flow effects, the changes in capital movements that policy makers perceive shortly after changes in the stance of monetary policy-or in money and credit conditions in general-are likely to be temporary. To a large extent, it is rising, not high, interest rates that induce permanent improvement in the capital account. As Tobin put it, "A country cannot expect to cover a basic deficit on current or long-term investment account indefinitely by attracting short-term money, unless it is prepared to jack its interest rates higher and higher." 8 The implication of the new view, then, is that policy steps like the interest equalization tax and "Operation Twist"-to the extent it actually was 7. Initial contributions to this literature include William H. Branson, Financial Capital Flows in the U.S. Balance of Payments (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Co., successful in "twisting"-stimulate an essentially one-time improvement in the capital account. Although there is a continuing-flow effect, it is probably small relative both to the initial stock effect and to subsequent stock shifts stemming from later changes in interest rates. In other words, the continuing-flow effects could tend to be swamped in the data by later stock shifts. On the other hand, the outflow following an easing of monetary policy will also be largely temporary and can be handled by official financing or use of reserves, rather than by retreating from a policy presumably designed to meet domestic needs.
This, then, in fairly general terms, is the new stock-adjustment view of international capital movements and its main implication for policy. The next section describes more precisely the relationship between the stockshift and continuing-flow effects of a given change in interest rates.
There follows a brief summary of some results of the empirical application of the stock-adjustment model to the data on U.S. financial capital flows. This application yields some rough estimates of the sensitivities of U.S. capital movements to changes in credit conditions, represented by changes in interest rates, the income velocity of money, and a credit rationing measure devised by Jaffee and Modigliani.9
The last two sections set out the implications of the analysis for domestic monetary policy, both in general and in terms of the outlook for 1970-71, and conclude with a few observations on the implications of the new view for monetary independence and proposals for reform of the international exchange rate system.
The Stock Equilibrium Model of Capital Movements
The portfolio distribution approach to the explanation of capital flows relates equilibrium stocks of assets to levels of rates of return and risk. For any given set of foreign and domestic interest rates and risk evaluations, there will be a given distribution of an individual's assets. Holdings of any asset-in particular, claims on foreigners Cf-will change as total assets or interest rates change. The discussion here focuses first on the stock and flow results of an interest rate change, and then on a few problems of empirical application of this model to the data. But if there is an upward trend in interest sensitivity, then the relative magnitudes of the flow and stock effects would be changed. The change would work in the direction of increasing U.S. capital outflows on average, however, only if foreign rates were rising relative to U.S. rates. Since that was not the way relative interest rates generally moved in the 1960s, an increase in the international interest sensitivity of liquid funds would have meant an augmented flow of funds into, not out of, the United States."3 12. This gives Cf = W(ao + alid + a2if + a8R + a4t), with a stock-shift effect of ACf = WalAid, and ef = W(ao + alid + a2if + a3R + a4t) + a4W, so that the flow effect is still ACf = WalAid, and the ratio is still WI W.
13. Implementation of a model with a trend in interest sensitivity would involve adding terms in idt and if t to equation (1). In empirical work to date, there is no evidence that this improves the explanation of capital flows. Splitting the data into 1960-64 and 1965-69 samples, for example, does not assign higher coefficients to interest rate changes in the latter period.
Thus as a working hypothesis, subject to testing for increasing interest sensitivity, the flow-stock relationship of equation (3) can be adopted.
PROBLEMS OF EMPIRICAL APPLICATION
The principal empirical implication of the flow-stock relationship derived above is that it will be hard to detect continuing-flow effects in aggregate data that come from a world of continually changing interest rates. With frequent changes in interest rates and the other determinants of equilibrium holdings of portfolio assets, the stock-shift effects will probably tend to overwhelm the flow effects in the data. This means that the existence of the continuing-flow effects will be hard to verify empirically, and will probably have to be built into the estimates by the use of an equation like (1).
Application of the portfolio model to the data requires numerous modifications. First, the existence of complications like transaction costs and tax laws means that adjustment to changes in interest rates will be lagged and incomplete. Since redistribution of existing portfolios may impose extra transaction costs, the redistribution may be accomplished by reallocating additions to the portfolio and leaving the existing stock unchanged. Such a process can spread the stock-shift effect over several quarters. If empirical work does not take this lag into account, it may appear to detect a relation between interest rate levels and capitalflows.
Furthermore, variables other than interest rates affect the measured flows. The next section takes account of the effect exports have on shortterm claims on foreigners through trade finance. A measure of the velocity of money and the Jaffee-Modigliani credit rationing index will be included to reflect availability effects that are not perfectly correlated with interest rates. Some alloWance must also be made for the effect of the balance-ofpayments programs and the interest equalization tax on U.S. flows.
Risk estimates, which enter the theoretical model of capital flows, are hard to specify empirically, and will be left out of the empirical estimates. This omission would seem on initial consideration to be particularly serious in the case of international capital movements. But that is basically an empirical question: If shifts in risk estimates in fact cause major movements of any category of capital, they should be reflected in large errors in an equation that omits such considerations. In addition, changes in risk estimates may cause only a reallocation of assets held abroad: If a foreign exchange crisis involving, say, the Deutschemark and the French franc causes U.S. investors to switch from French to German investments, this will not affect the total of U.S. claims on foreigners.
Even with all of these empirical difficulties, fairly regular relationships can be found between capital flows and the key determinants identified above-interest rates, money velocities, and total assets. The next section reports briefly some results of the application of the portfolio stockadjustment theory to the determination of changes in U.S. claims on private foreigners. These claims are divided into three categories that exhaust the asset side of the capital account, with the exception of direct investment. This discussion will provide an idea of the expected magnitude of the stock and flow effects of changes in interest rates and velocity. The estimates are then used in discussing the probable effects of monetary policy on the assets side of the U.S. capital account in 1970-71. I am currently working on the estimation of equations on the liability side, but the results are not ready to be reported. Flows of foreign-owned capital would move in the same direction as U.S. capital in response to changes in monetary conditions, so they would add to the effects of alternative monetary policies reported in Table 2 .
The Explanation of U.S. Capital Flows
The results reported here come from the application to the 1960-69 quarterly data of an equation that is essentially a first-differenced form of equation (1). I will seek to explain changes in U.S. holdings of three categories of foreign assets: (1) short-term private claims /C8; (2) long-term nondirect, nonbanking claims LC'., here called "portfolio claims"; and (3) long-term banking claims AB.
Short-term (less than one year) private claims include short-term bank loans and acceptances extended to foreigners; trade credit extended by U.S. firms to foreigners; short-term foreign securities held by Americans; and deposits of Americans in foreign banks, including holdings of Eurodollars by Americans. Portfolio claims consist of foreign stocks and bonds held by Americans, excluding equities representing direct investment abroad, while long-term banking claims are term loans to foreigners.
In general, I have used U.S. and various foreign short-and long-term interest rates and income velocities of money v as measures of U.S. credit conditions. I have also experimented with the Jaffee-Modigliani index cr as an explicit measure of U.S. credit rationing. If U.S. credit conditions tighten either because there is an exogenous increase in credit demand with given supply conditions, or because growth of the money supply is slowed in order to retard growth in GNP, the whole set of indicators of monetary tightness-interest rates, velocity, and credit rationing-would be expected to rise. The velocity and credit rationing variables should represent movements in the domestic opportunity cost of foreign lending to the extent that changes in credit conditions are not fully reflected in changes in interest rates. In addition, these variables may reflect a tendency of U.S. lenders to put foreign borrowers near the end of the credit rationing line. Each term on the right-hand side of equation (4) potentially represents a weighted sum of its current and lagged values. In general, lag lengths were extended until the coefficients of the furthest lagged values became insignificant. This procedure was followed to allow for the possibility of an extended lag in the stock-shift adjustment of financial capital to changes in monetary conditions. As will be seen shortly, lag lengths generally do not exceed three or four quarters, suggesting that the stock adjustment is generally completed within a year after a change in monetary conditions.
The equations for short-and long-term portfolio claims were estimated including three seasonal dummies, while no seasonal variation was found in the equation for long-term banking claims. The coefficients of the seasonal dummies are reported and discussed in Appendix A.
SHORT-TERM CLAIMS
Several modifications of the basic equation (4) must be made in order to apply it to changes in U.S. short-term claims on private foreigners AC8. First, it is necessary to recognize that a large proportion of U.S. short-term lending is related to trade credit. To take account of this factor, I have added terms involving current and lagged changes in merchandise exports X. Exports are measured in millions of dollars, at quarterly rates, not seasonally adjusted.'5 A given stock of trade credit will finance a given flow of trade, so that it is levels of exports that are related to stocks of assets, and it is changes in exports that generate capital flows.
Thus if the flow of exports increases from one level to another, the effect on the balance of payments will be partially offset by a stock-shift increase in trade credit. After this stock shift is completed, the increase in exports becomes a clear gain to the balance of payments.
The The numbers in parentheses beneath coefficients here and in subsequent empirical equations are t statistics. It should be noted that the longest lag length in equation (5) is two quarters. This indicates that the stock-shift effect on short-term claims will be completed within three quarters after a change in interest rates.
LONG-TERM PORTFOLIO CLAIMS
Two minor modifications of the basic capital flow equation (4) must be made to apply it to flows of U.S. long-term portfolio capital AC', which is residually defined as changes in U.S. claims on foreigners exclusive of direct investment, short-term claims, and long-term banking claims. The first modification is the inclusion of an adjustment for the interest equalization tax, which was imposed on U.S. purchases of foreign long-term portfolio assets in July of 1963. Canadian issues were exempted. The tax essentially reduces the return on foreign portfolio assets by imposing an additional cost on their purchase. Ideally, to take account of the tax, the relevant foreign long-term interest rates should be adjusted downward to the effective rates of return net of the tax. But since the Canadian long-term interest rate is the only foreign long-term rate in the equation for longterm portfolio claims, I have used a dummy for the tax, IET, that is set at unity in 1963:3-1963:4 and zero otherwise."7
The second modification is the inclusion of the Eurodollar rate in the equation to reflect credit conditions in Europe. The Eurodollar rate iED was included in the first estimated version of all the asset equations in order to test generally for sensitivity of U.S. capital flows to pressures from the Eurodollar market. The rate is highly significant in the equation for long-term portfolio capital.
The equation for AC' was estimated using a number of foreign longterm interest rates and velocity measures, as reported in Appendix A. None of the velocity measures was significant, and of the foreign longterm rates, only the Canadian rate iCNA had a t ratio greater than unity. The Canadian long-term rate was retained in the final equation because more than half of U.S. long-term portfolio capital flows have been bilateral with Canada since the interest equalization tax was imposed.
The "final" estimated equation for AC' is: ( 1 The sum of the A(AvUs)t_ coefficients is -4.43, with a standard error of 1.76.18 Neither the U.S. long-term interest rate nor the credit rationing index was at all significant in any of the estimates leading to (7). As suggested earlier, the equation for AB is highly sensitive to the adjustments made for the disturbances of the 1963:4-1965:1 period. This sensitivity raises doubts about any conclusions that may be drawn from (7) except one-the U.S. velocity term is significant, with a lag length of about a year, in all versions of the equation. As shown in Appendix A, when the equation is reestimated on the sample period 1965:4-1969:4, the coefficients of the velocity terms become larger and more significant. This justifies the inclusion of the velocity sensitivity of AB in the multiplier estimates to be discussed in the next section. The four-quarter lag in changes in U.S. velocity in equation (7) suggests that it takes a little more than a year for long-term banking claims to complete the stock adjustment that follows a change in monetary conditions. Thus long-term banking claims have the slowest speed of adjustment of the three categories of assets that are considered in this paper.
STOCK AND FLOW MULTIPLIERS FOR U.S. CAPITAL FLOWS
The estimated equations for U.S. financial capital flows-the nondirect investment asset side of the capital account-yield the stock-shift multipliers shown in Table 1 million.
An increase of 1 percentage point in the U.S. Treasury bill rate will cause a stock-shift inflow of $342 million in short-term claims over three quarters.
Similarly, the coefficient of A(WvUs) in equation (5) for AC8 is -454.9, so that the vus multiplier for an increase of 0.1 in vu7, is given by -454.9 X 3.02 X 0.1 = -$137.3 million.
As noted earlier, the continuing-flow effect (or multiplier) of a given interest rate change is equal to the growth rate of the underlying asset or wealth variable times the stock-shift effect. With both household net worth W and total bank assets A growing at about 7 percent annually in recent years, the continuing-flow multipliers would be 0.07 times the stock-shift multipliers of Table 1 Third, the econometric results presented here do not "test" the portfolio stock-adjustment theory in any significant way. Rather, the equations are rough estimates of the parameters conditional on the assumption that the theory is correct; the theory has been imposed on the data. The fact that the results do not violate common sense encourages the view that the theory is, in fact, correct. But this is no test of an hypothesis.
The net result of these considerations is that, if international capital movements follow the same principles that other capital movements do, and especially if they are subject to the theory of portfolio distribution, then the present estimates should provide policy makers a reasonable view of the international implications of shifts in monetary policy. With this reassurance, however dubious, these estimates can now be applied, first, to the problem facing monetary policy in the remainder of 1970 and in 1971, and second, to the question of national monetary independence and proposals for improving the processes for adjusting the balance of payments.
Capital Flows with a Shift in Monetary Policy: The Outlook for 1970-71
The estimates of the previous section suggest that a shift to monetary ease will cause a fairly large stock-shift increase in the capital account deficit, but that after two or three quarters the continuing-flow effect will be fairly small. The simulation of the diferential impact of two assumptions concerning money supply growth through 1971:4 shown in Table 2 Table 2 simulation implicitly assumes that foreign interest rates do not respond to changes in the U.S. interest rate and velocity. To the extent that foreign rates do respond, they would move in the same direction, making the change in differentials smaller than the change in U.S. values. Thus the net effect of the interest differential on U.S. capital outflow would be smaller than that reported in Table 2 . Combining a single GNP path with both the high and low monetary paths involves an assumption about the monetary-fiscal policy mix. To realize the specified GNP path with the low monetary path, fiscal policy must supply compensatory stimulus. With the high monetary path, fiscal policy presumably would be tighter, and interest rates would fall more substantially. Thus the Table 2 simulation reports the differential effect of a shift in the mix of monetary and fiscal policy that leaves the GNP path unchanged. The impact for capital flows of a shift to monetary ease would be lessened if a fixed fiscal policy were assumed so that the GNP path were higher with the higher monetary path. Table 2 also shows the differential effect of the alternative monetary paths on the three-month Treasury bill rate, using a recent estimate of a demand-for-money function made by Modigliani, Rasche, and Cooper.22 The bill rate is, of course, lower for the higher monetary path. The difference between the alternative bill rates grows to 1.41 percentage points in 1970:4 and then narrows to 0.89 point as the velocities remain constant after that quarter. This movement reflects the overshooting of interest rates in response to changes in money supply, a usual result in models in which actual money holdings are adjusted to desired levels with a lag.
In the last three columns of Table 2 The total differential impact is shown in the last column of Table 2 . The difference between the stock-shift and continuing-flow effects is striking. This kind of effect, coupled with perhaps a similar effect on the liabilities side of the capital account, might be of major concern to the monetary authority who worries about the balance of payments. Indeed the concern might be sufficient to cause him to regret choosing the high monetary path, but only if he failed to realize that the phenomenon was mainly a transitory stock-shift effect. By 1971 :4, the differential effect on the outflow would be down to a quarterly rate of less than $50 million. Thus if the stock-shift outflow can be handled by official financing-that is, by persuading a foreign central bank to hold the dollars-or absorbed as a reserve loss, the steady-state differential effect of the shift to monetary ease is small, here perhaps $200 million a year on the U.S. assets side of the capital account.
One central point for monetary policy is brought out by the purely illustrative numbers of Table 2 . It is the basic theme that has run through this paper. When monetary policy eases and velocity and interest rates fall, there will be a substantial capital outflow over two or three quarters due to the change in policy. After this transition, the continuing flow owing to the change in policy will be small. But events will be misinterpreted if the monetary authority implicitly holds a flow theory of capital movements. In that case, as he watches the large capital outflow in the months following the easing of policy, he will believe that outflow will continue, and at least question the wisdom of the easier monetary policy. Thus the flow theory could lead to a substantial overestimate of the damage easier money would do to the balance of payments, and could result in a monetary stance that was overly restrictive in terms of vital domestic objectives. But if the monetary authority takes the correct stock-adjustment view, he will realize that the large outflow, while certainly worrisome, is transitory and manageable, and that the longer-run effects will be relatively minor. This view would lead to a better-and smaller-estimate of the effect of an easier policy on the balance of payments and thus put the international constraint on monetary policy in its correct-and diminished-role.
To be sure, a sufficiently large stock-shift outflow could reduce reserves enough to call the existing value of the parity rate into question, even if speculators knew the capital flow was a one-time shift. But the shifts that are under consideration here seem reasonably small compared with total reserves.
A final point is that the stock-shift effects of changes in monetary policy are not only large, but also uncertain. The estimates come from equations that, while reasonably good for this stage of econometric work in the field, still have large standard errors. This additional bit of uncertainty with respect to the effects of monetary policy reinforces the point that, wherever possible, monetary and fiscal policy should be applied in the same direction.24 The support of fiscal policy will reduce the magnitude of necessary changes in monetary policy, and thus reduce the size of the probable resulting stock shift.
Monetary Independence and Exchange-Rate Systems
The previous section pointed out that the stock-adjustment view of capital flows will give a correct, and generally small, estimate of the continuing outflow generated by an easing of monetary policy. This also implies that monetary policy changes, within a reasonable range of variation, will not have a major continuing effect on the balance of payments in a full employment economy. From one point of view, this is bad: It reduces the number of effective policy instruments for balance-of-payments adjustment. But from another point of view, this is good: It frees monetary policy to serve domestic objectives. If monetary policy will have only small continuing effects on capital flows, then its stance can be determined mainly with reference to the domestic situation.
The gradual drift of the capital account balance, generated by growing portfolios in a world of domestically focused monetary policies, could be compensated for by a gradual change in exchange rates that adjusts the current account to balance the capital account. One major argument against such a "crawling peg" system has been that it will impose an additional interest rate constraint on monetary volicv.25 It is argued on a flow 25. This point is discussed at more length in Branson and Willett, "Policy Toward Short-term Capital Movements." theory basis that a downward drift in an established equilibrium exchange rate will generate a continuing capital outflow, requiring the depreciating country to maintain its interest rates above those abroad by an amount equal to the rate of change of the exchange rate.
But in the stock-adjustment model, with expected rates of change of exchange rates playing a role analogous to that of interest rates, the shift from an expected rate of change of zero to some negative value will bring a stock-shift outflow. When the rate stabilizes at a lower level and the expected rate of change returns to zero, there will be an equal and opposite stock-shift inflow. Thus if official financing (so-called recycling) of these transitory shifts can be arranged, there is no need for interest rates to be adjusted to compensate for the crawl of the exchange rate.
This strengthens the view that exchange rates should be adjusted gradually through some kind of crawling peg system to provide changes in the current account that compensate for movements in the capital account. In this case, monetary policy can be partially freed from the balance-ofpayments constraint and used with an eye more toward domestic needs. The U.S., U.K., Swiss, and German long-term bond rates were also tried, as well as the U.S., U.K., and Canadian short-term rates. None of these rates was significant, and the coefficients of most had the wrong signs. The U.K., Canadian, and a weighted average of European velocities were also tried without success. Contrary to what one might expect, U.S. velocity and the credit rationing variable appear to act independently of one another. Leaving one of the two out of the equation has very little effect on the size and significance of the coefficient of the other.
Long-term Banking Claims
Equation (7) Other interest rates tried were the Canadian long-term rate, the U.S. short and long rates, and the Eurodollar rate. Foreign velocities and the credit rationing variable were also tried.
The size and significance of the coefficients of (7) were extreniely sensitive to the exact form chosen for the program dummies. As a result an Table 1 show that net flows would take place even with a parallel shift. Finally, the statement underlines the deficit on basic transactions-a concept that has less and less meaning for the United States.
Branson argues and works to demonstrate that the econometric problems of the portfolio adjustment approach are tractable. I agree, but I would like to point out some of the problems. The data are very poor, involving gaps and errors of measurement. Moreover, institutional peculiarities distort the flows, and special factors can have a large and erratic impact from time to time. For these reasons, the specification of relationships becomes very important, perhaps the most crucial part of the work. And I do have problems with some of the specified relationships in the paper. I am troubled by the specification for equation (5)-for short-term claims. There is a special dummy variable dealing with the voluntary foreign credit restraint program. I submit that no one who had not looked at the data would have specified the equation in this particular way. The program placed a ceiling on how much banks could lend abroad and that ceiling permitted some increase, but, in fact, banks stayed well below the ceiling. That is not explainable in terms of profit maximization. Branson's explanation is that banks wanted to operate without worrying about the ceiling. But they are used to working subject to reserve requirements, and there is a secondary market for reserves. The explanation really isn't very adequate.
The absence of the U.S. bond rate in the equation for long-term portfolio claims is also disturbing. The theory insists that the bond rate belongs there to represent the alternative U.S. asset. I know it is omitted because it does not work empirically. Maybe some other variables that appear are picking up the influence of the U.S. bond rate. This may be particularly true of the Eurodollar rate. That rate is supposed to reflect the demand for, and the supply of, dollars in Europe. When there is a gap between Regulation Q ceilings and money market rates in the United States, the Eurodollar rate also reflects U.S. excess demand for dollars coming from Europe, and thus U.S. rather than European monetary conditions. So it may at times be a proxy for the U.S. bond rate.
Another troublesome element in the long-term portfolio equation is the dummy for the interest equalization tax. When properly scaled, the tax should be usable as an explanatory variable in some continuous form-not merely as a dummy. In addition, since the Canadians are exempted, it would theoretically be preferable to have data separate for those countries subject to the tax and those exempted.
Long-term banking claims provide the classic example of the major special factors on the international side. Before 1963 it was the most predictable item in the balance of payments because it was a specialized business. Term loans by banks to foreigners were a very complicated, unrewarding kind of business so they were not used much. Before 1963, to forecast it, all one had to know was the delivery of ships to Norwegian shipowners because that was all that term loans financed. Then the interest equalization tax placed a 15 percent tax on long-term capital flows of securities but no tax on bank loans. It suddenly became very profitable to expand term loans. The whole concept changed. It was no longer in the same ball park. Quarterly flows went from $50 million to $500 million. That may still seem a small number to GNP experts but it is big in the balance of payments.
For all my criticism, I think the illustrative examples do teach Branson's lesson-to stay calm about capital flows when monetary policy shifts. Time must be allowed for the capital account to settle down. Some lessons may even be offered here for domestic monetary managers. If a certain amount of liquidity is injected into the domestic economy, some of that is going to leak abroad in the early quarters. Hence, the domestic impact will be held down initially. More mileage may be gotten out of the same injection of fuel subsequently, because there will be less leakage abroad.
John Kareken: Branson finds both comforting and discomforting implications of the new view. I basically agree with his verdict, but I'd like to elaborate and amend it on both sides. First, he finds it discomforting because monetary policy no longer offers a handle on international adjustments. That loss of an instrument applies for long-term, steady-state policy solutions. But the new view does not foreclose the use of monetary policy to finance temporarily some disturbance by raising or lowering interest rates successively over a few years. Monetary policy remains a way of dealing with temporary international adjustment problems.
On the other hand, Branson finds it comforting that monetary policy is more or less freed from the balance-of-payments constraint and can be determined largely by domestic considerations. That may or may not be right depending on the initial stock of reserves and the nation's consequent ability to accept a sizable one-shot loss. It is easy to imagine a country that goes bankrupt by easing monetary policy. I could even forgive someone who felt a bit nervous about a 10 percent loss of U.S. reserves. Even when the change in policy is a rather modest one, something may have to be added for loss due to speculation, particularly in the case of the United States if the distribution of demand between gold and dollars is at all affected. I can conceive of people understanding fully the stock-adjustment view of the world but estimating the probability of a parity change on the basis of the stock of reserves. That could cause some trouble in the short run.
Branson's simulations focus on an easing of monetary policy that represents a shift in the fiscal-monetary mix with no net impact on aggregate demand. Of course, monetary policy may also be used as a net stimulus to raise GNP. In that event it is clear that the capital outflow is going to be less than in the case of the same monetary easing to shift the mix. But then effects on the current account may become significant with the change in GNP.
The empirical work proceeds as though interest rates in the rest of the world are independent of United States demands for claims on foreigners. This does not seem to square with complaints we heard from Europeans when the Regulation Q ceiling was operative.
Other findings also raise suspicions that the equations may not have captured the real world. For example, the credit rationing variable appears significant only in the long-term portfolio equation and that is the one equation that does not directly reflect decisions by banks. I am not surprised that it is significant in that equation. If the nonbanking sector is rationed in its demand for bank loans, it can help finance itself in effect by buying fewer claims from foreigners. But I cannot explain why the variable is not significant in the other two equations. Also, a bewildering array of interest rates shows up in the equations. Perhaps it would have been more straightforward to take a weighted average of foreign interest rates and do or die with that variable.
I would be happier if I understood the role velocity is intended to play in the analysis. If it is meant to serve as a proxy for credit rationing, then I doubt that foreign velocity belongs in the specification. Since the data reject the inclusion of foreign velocity, this should be a welcome view. It probably ought not to be specified. When Europeans are being rationed out of their banks, the supply of claims offered to lenders will be affected, but the U.S. demand for claims will not be altered. If these are demand equations, the velocities can be interpreted as proxies for interest rates. Since there is an abundance of interest rate series, I do not know why a proxy should be needed.
Walter Salant: Branson makes the point that the stock-adjustment view of capital flows weakens one important objection to the "crawling peg" system of exchange rates. I think that a proponent of fixed rates could find reasons why this new view also makes flexibility of exchange rates less necessary. One reason it is thought necessary is that the fixed-rate system inhibits the freedom to use monetary policy. If capital flows reflect stock adjustments, central bankers ought to feel they have more freedom than they previously thought they had. If, for example, they want to tighten money to restrict domestic demand, they need not be so inhibited by the danger of attracting foreign funds, because they will recognize that the inflow of those funds will be temporary.
One might argue, in response, that a temporary inflow is sufficient to offset a restrictive policy, since monetary policy affects demand by operating on the stock of money or liquid assets. This response raises another question: whether domestic demand is affected by the proportion of a given money stock (or given stock of liquid assets) that is owned by foreigners. Suppose the effects on total demand depend not on the total supply of domestic money but only, or mainly, on the domestically owned portion of it. Then the effect of an increase in interest rates would not be fully, and maybe only slightly, offset by an equal increase in foreign-owned money. The question of whether domestic demand is affected by who owns the money supply, and of how that ownership is affected by changes in interest rates, may seem unimportant because foreign ownership of the U.S. money supply is so small. But that isn't the case for other countries.
William Branson: On the interpretation of velocity-it may be supplementing interest rates in measuring the opportunity cost of lending abroad. If domestic money markets tighten, velocity goes up; the opportunity cost of lending to foreigners also goes up. Presumably the velocity increase is picking up some kind of extra return on lending at home that may not be caught in any of the interest rate series, since credit markets are not perfect.
The best way to handle the interest equalization tax would be to adjust foreign interest rates for its effect. The tax was meant to create a wedge between gross and net foreign interest rates as they appear to U.S. potential lenders. I am planning to make that adjustment if I can find the appropriate interest rates to adjust. In their absence, something else had to be done in this paper.
I agree with John Kareken that under the new view, monetary policy can still be used to finance temporary, reversible perturbations in the United States balance of payments. If something temporarily happened to the current account, then it might be useful to raise interest rates for a while. But I am concerned lest U.S. interest rates might be pushed not just temporarily higher but, rather, permanently higher, because of anxiety about the balance of payments.
General Discussion
While most of the participants in the discussion expressed their support for the stock-adjustment approach, important reservations were noted by James Duesenberry, William Poole, and William Brainard. Duesenberry accepted the basic logic of this kind of stock approach to portfolios, but stressed that the speed of that stock adjustment and the factors influencing that speed are of great importance. The rapidity of the stock adjustment implied by Branson's results seemed too good to be completely credible. Duesenberry cited findings on domestic portfolio adjustments that indicated they may be spread over a period of several years. Especially for assets with long maturities, a large proportion is effectively locked in by the heavy transaction costs involved in portfolio shifting. The old stock is only gradually adjusted to its new equilibrium proportions. On the other hand, increases in assets can be handled much more flexibly.
Duesenberry argued that such a slow process would look, in practice, very much like a flow adjustment to anybody who is worrying about the balance of payments. The basic logic would be a portfolio stock adjustment, but the current flow variables would be governing the speed of adjustment. Duesenberry also suggested that the advent of convertibility in 1958 presented one case of a very large change in international returns and risks. If people had reacted to that change with the speed estimated in the Branson paper, there would have been an enormous outflow in a very short period of time.
William Poole reported on his own experience analyzing Canadian capital flows. He had found the empirical results distressingly sensitive to the sample period chosen. Although he preferred the stock-adjustment formulation on theoretical grounds, the flow formulation had yielded somewhat superior empirical results.
Poole stated his judgment that errors in the measurement of capital flows tend to bias the coefficients for speed of adjustment in the direction of indicating a faster shift than really occurs. Similarly, he felt that the difficulty of measuring the appropriate interest rate biases downward estimates of the interest elasticity. Both of these biases make the estimated effects of changes in interest rates inappropriately small.
William Brainard commented that the stock-adjustment view of the world was not reassuring if the desired proportions of portfolios change very substantially in response to small changes in yields. What makes Branson's results reassuring is their implication that long-run changes in proportions are quite small-that international assets are not very interest sensitive. But these results might signify merely that Branson's rather special specification is not adequate for capturing the lagged adjustments that continue after the initial few quarters.
Branson replied by noting that long lags of adjustment following interest rate changes are implied by the opposing view and they just do not show up in the data. He also suggested that, because there may have been a long reaction to the change to convertibility in 1958, one should not infer that people have long reaction times to changes in interest rates. The advent of convertibility was a major structural change; it is not a happy analogy to interest rate changes. People in these markets are continually watching interest rates, and they have every incentive to translate yield differentials into prompt portfolio action.
